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ANATOMY OF A GOVERNANCE
TRANSFORMATION: THE CASE OF
DAIMLER-BENZ
DENNIS E.  LOGUE* AND JAMES K.  SEWARD**
I
INTRODUCTION
In 1996, the McKinsey Global Institute released a study posing the follow-
ing question: If savings rates in Germany and Japan have been so high for a
long time relative to those in the United States, why have their per capita gross
domestic products (“GDP”) not grown to be much greater than that of the
United States?1  Surprisingly, the answer is that capital productivity in the
United States has been significantly greater than capital productivity in Ger-
many and Japan.  Indeed, over the period of 1974 to 1993, the study found that
the real after-tax rate of return to all investment in the corporate sector aver-
aged 9.1% per annum in the United States, but only 7.4% per annum in Ger-
many and 7.1% per annum in Japan.2
Capital has been invested much more efficiently in the United States than
in Germany or Japan.  More detailed analysis indicates that there is much over-
investment in Germany and Japan and, hence, unutilized capacity.  In particu-
lar, Germany has witnessed much “gold-plating” of capital investment, that is,
the installation of equipment that is much better—and more expensive—than is
required.3  Moreover, there has been no offsetting improvement in labor pro-
ductivity.  Consequently, despite heavy investment, living standards have not
improved significantly in Germany or Japan relative to those in the United
States.
Why is there inefficient investment in Germany and Japan?  It is not caused
by lack of investment tools because managers in both countries have access to
the same tools that U.S. managers use to identify productive investments and to
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1. See MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., CAPITAL PRODUCTIVITY 2 (1996).
2. See id. at 1.
3. See id.  “[F]or many German firms ineffective investment planning lowered capacity utiliza-
tion, and ‘gold-plating’ and over engineering were common.  For example, the phone cables of Deut-
sche Telecom must be able to withstand being run over by a tank.”  Id. at 3.
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operate them efficiently.  The over-investment must be caused by German and
Japanese managers’ decisions leading to excessive investment relative to the
standards of economic efficiency.  This article suggests that there is inefficiency
by design, induced by the goals and systems of corporate governance in these
countries.
An article in this volume by Bradley et al. provides some theoretical insight
into this issue.4  The authors categorize corporate governance systems as either
“contractarian” or “communitarian.”  At the risk of oversimplification, a con-
tractarian system encourages firms to focus on shareholder value.  A communi-
tarian system, in contrast, responds to all “stakeholders:” creditors, employees,
customers, and communities where corporate operations are located and, fi-
nally, stockholders.  The concern for a much broader constituency may lead to
over-investment, often to the detriment of shareholders.  Over-investment
helps creditors, particularly when firms diversify because of co-insurance ef-
fects, and it helps employees because diversifying investment creates jobs and
improves job security.  Furthermore, it aids customers by creating more con-
sumer choice, and it helps the community by broadening the tax base.
Approaching the governance question from another perspective, La Porta
et al. find that countries without common law traditions and strong shareholder
protections do not have well-developed external capital markets.5  Not only
does this mean that companies must look to the banking sector for financing,
but it also means  that neither activist shareholders nor the market is imposing
much external discipline on companies for corporate control.  The result is that
banks control corporate financing and investment decisions, and, in their posi-
tions primarily as lenders and secondarily as equity holders, they encourage
corporations to invest up to inefficient levels so long as credit quality remains
sufficiently high.
Though many scholars believe the two systems of corporate governance—
contractarian and communitarian—can co-exist in a globally competitive
world,6 Bradley et al. argue otherwise.7  They contend that the forces of globali-
zation and worldwide competition for capital will eventually force corpora-
tions—and the countries in which they are domiciled—to shift to the contrac-
tarian paradigm to set corporate goals and implement governance systems.
Risk-taking capital providers must receive adequate rewards for providing fi-
nancing to global competitors.
In this article, we provide empirical evidence using a detailed case study to
support the Bradley et al. hypothesis that the trend toward the contractarian
                                                          
4. See Michael Bradley et al., The Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation in Contempo-
rary Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (Summer 1999).
5. See Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1137-50
(1997).
6. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, German “Populism” and the Large Public Corporation, 14 INT’L REV.
L. & ECON. 187-202 (1994); Andrei Shleiffer & Robert Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52
J. FIN. 737, 769 (1997).
7. See Bradley et al., supra note 4, at 85-86.
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model is actually occurring.  In the case study, we examine the evolutionary
transformation in the corporate governance structure of Daimler-Benz A.G.,
the largest German industrial company.8
An examination of Daimler-Benz, now DaimlerChrysler, is noteworthy for
several reasons.  First, the automotive industry is acutely affected by each of
the five major force changes identified by Bradley et al.  Because these changes
are predicted to induce the need for change in corporate governance systems,
the industry itself represents a natural starting point to examine the impact of
these environmental changes on the corporate governance practices of multina-
tional enterprises.
Second, capital acquisition is an important source for investment in the
automotive industry.  Because Daimler-Benz’s recent capital needs exceeded
its internally generated funds and available domestic sources of funds, it is pos-
sible to examine the relationship between the need for external funds, the ne-
cessity of tapping global sources of capital, and the transformation of a firm’s
corporate governance structure.
Third, the announcement and completion of the merger agreement between
Daimler-Benz and Chrysler Corporation provides an opportunity to examine
the impact of a significant corporate event on the melding of somewhat distinct
corporate governance systems.  In particular, the combination of a firm histori-
cally managed under the contractarian model of corporate governance—
Chrysler—and a firm historically managed under the communitarian model of
corporate governance—Daimler-Benz—provides an interesting, natural ex-
periment in which to examine the marginal impact of a corporate combination
on distinct corporate governance structures.
Overall, the evidence supports the view that, over the last several years,
Daimler-Benz has taken numerous steps toward prioritizing shareholder value
more intensely than ever before.  Moreover, there exists virtually no evidence
to suggest that the company will deviate from this focus in the future.  The evi-
dence supports the hypothesis that even before the decision to acquire Chrys-
ler, Daimler-Benz shifted toward a contractarian governance system as a mat-
ter of survival in a world of intense global competition in financial and product
markets.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows.  Part II offers a brief
overview of the German corporate governance system in which Daimler-Benz
operates.9  Part III enumerates the steps taken by Daimler-Benz to signal to the
                                                          
8. When this article was first drafted, Daimler-Benz and Chrysler had not yet publicly announced
their merger talks.  Since then, Daimler-Benz has merged with Chrysler, forming DaimlerChrysler.
We have chosen to retain the focus on Daimler-Benz because its actions toward becoming a more
shareholder-focused company began before its public involvement with Chrysler.  Its merger with
Chrysler simply continued a well-established trend.
9. There are many fine, detailed discussions of German corporate governance.  Bradley et al.,
supra note 4, provide an excellent analysis.  For discussions that do not foretell the demise of the Ger-
man corporate governance system, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Govern-
ance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States,
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world that its focus has changed from delicately balancing the interests of its
many constituencies to paying increased attention to shareholder value crea-
tion.  Part III also considers the results of Daimler-Benz’s actions.  The article
concludes by asking whether the transformation is more likely to be temporary
or permanent. Will DaimlerChrysler continue its pursuit of shareholder value
or will it revert to its communitarian ways?
II
GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND DAIMLER-BENZ
Banks dominate German financial markets and the financial structure of
most large German firms.10  Daimler-Benz is no exception.
In the late 1980s, the top five shareholders in Daimler-Benz were banks,
which controlled 78.39% of the voting stock.11  Deutsche Bank alone owned
nearly thirty percent and controlled more than forty-one percent of the voting
stock in 1990.12  Just before Daimler-Benz listed its American Depository Re-
ceipts (“ADRs”) on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) in 1993, Deut-
sche Bank owned roughly twenty-eight percent of Daimler-Benz stock.13  By
June 1998, it owned approximately twenty-two percent as a result of its own
stock sales and new shares issued by Daimler-Benz.14  Although Deutsche Bank
still retains a large fraction of ownership, it has reduced its ownership by a sig-
nificant margin.  Currently, the second largest owner of Daimler-Benz is the
government of Kuwait, with thirteen percent of the stock.15
Large German companies have two governing boards: the supervisory
board and the management board.  The supervisory board is composed of di-
rectors and representatives of various labor groups, including “white collar”
employees.  Half of the board is elected by  shareholders, and the other half is
elected by employees.  The chairman has two votes to break ties.16  The man-
agement board is composed of the corporation’s top managers.  It is responsi-
ble for the day-to-day management of the firm and reports to the supervisory
board.17
The supervisory board of Daimler-Benz has twenty members.  The chair-
man of Daimler-Benz’s supervisory board, Hilmar Kopper, also happens to be
the chairman of Deutsche Bank’s management board.  Of the nine other share-
                                                          
48 STAN. L. REV. 73, 73-109 (1995); Mark Roe, Some Differences in the Corporate Structure in Ger-
many, Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927, 1927-2003 (1993).
10. See Roe, supra note 9, at 1937-47.
11. See id. at 1938.  Voting power in Germany often resides with the custodians of the securities.
These five banks did not own 78.1% of the stock; they only controlled this percentage of votes.
12. See id. at 1938, 1998.
13. See David Waller, Deutsche Bank Signals Rethink of 28% in Daimler Benz, FIN. TIMES, Mar.
18, 1993, at 25.
14. See Daimler-Benz, SEC Form 20-F, at 31 (Apr. 16, 1997).
15. See id.
16. See Daimler-Benz, SEC Form 20-F, at 61 (Apr. 8, 1998).
17. See id. at 63.
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holder-elected directors, three are top officials at Germany’s leading banks.
Banks have played a significant role in the governance of Daimler-Benz and
are still very influential.
The key functions of the supervisory board are to appoint the management
board and to approve major corporate decisions, including corporate strategy.
Evidence gathered by Steven Kaplan indicates that German supervisory boards
are responsive to poor stock returns and earnings losses.18  Top managers are
fired for poor financial performance but not for failing to achieve growth.  It
appears that only a threat to the safety of the large bank debt carried by Ger-
man firms can be cause for termination.  As long as the company remains fi-
nancially secure, managers seem to have little reason to worry about job secu-
rity.
Edzard Reuter, chairman of Daimler-Benz, was replaced in 1995 when
Daimler–Benz’s stock price was still below its 1986 price.  The company was
experiencing serious losses, and it became clear that the company was in dire
need of restructuring as a consequence of excessive diversification.19  Ironically,
much of the diversification Daimler-Benz had achieved was motivated and fi-
nanced by the banks because bank loans can be made safer if firms diversify,
even though shareholders may lose from this form of investment.20
It is notable that not only is corporate governance dominated by bankers,
but German corporate finance is also dominated by banks.21  Roughly speaking,
for every dollar a German company obtains from external capital markets, it
obtains $4.20 from banks.  In contrast, an American firm borrows only eighty-
five cents from banks for every dollar it raises in capital markets.22
This bank dominance effectively means that under the traditional system of
corporate governance in Germany, external capital markets exert little disci-
pline.  This lack of discipline may account for the over-investment that led to
the low investment returns noted earlier.  So long as investments produce re-
turns sufficient to meet debt service obligations, lenders tolerate excessive in-
vestment because the loser is the shareholder, the residual claimant.  Similarly,
labor tolerates excessive investment—labor representatives comprise one-half
of a German firm’s supervisory board—because it creates jobs and the loss is,
once again, borne by the shareholder.  In the Daimler-Benz case, forty percent
of the shareholder representatives to the supervisory board were and are bank-
ers who also lend to Daimler-Benz.23  Accordingly, the calculation they might
make when Daimler-Benz borrows to over-invest is whether their profits on the
loans offset the opportunity costs on their stock holdings.
                                                          
18. See Steven N.  Kaplan, Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany, 10 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 142, 148-55 (1994).
19. See John Templeman et al., Revolution at Daimler, BUS. WK., Feb. 5, 1996, at 56, 56-57.
20. Daimler-Benz had borrowed so much that its equity equaled only about 20% of total assets.
21. See Macey & Miller, supra note 9, at 89.
22. See id.
23. See Daimler-Benz, supra note 16, at 62.  Ten of the board members are bankers who lend to
Daimler-Benz.  See Roe, supra note 9, at 1998.
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Finally, German accounting systems can obscure the true picture of a com-
pany’s financial health.24  This alone can cause equity investors to avoid the
stock and may, in fact, penalize such companies with a much higher cost of eq-
uity than they would enjoy with greater transparency.
When Daimler-Benz agreed to produce a set of books consistent with U.S.
Generally Accepted Accounting Practices (“GAAP”) before listing on the
NYSE, huge reserve accounts were uncovered, and Deutsche Marks (“DM”) 4
billion in pension provisions were reclassified as extraordinary profit for 1992.25
To further illustrate, Daimler-Benz’s 1995 Annual Report shows 1993 net in-
come of DM 615 million using German GAAP but a loss of DM 1,839 million
using U.S. GAAP.26  United States GAAP are more informative because there
are fewer reserve accounts in which to hide profits in good years and on which
to draw upon in bad years to smooth reported income.27  This increased trans-
parency alone is beneficial to shareholders and will tend to make the company
more responsive to their concerns.  Clearer financial statements present share-
holders with a better picture of what is wrong with the company.
III
THE TRANSFORMATION OF DAIMLER-BENZ
A. Overview
Daimler-Benz was—and DaimlerChrysler is—Germany’s largest industrial
corporation.  It has four main product lines: automobiles; aeroplanes and aero-
space; rail systems, diesels, and electrical components; and services, which are
mostly financial in nature.  Its former chairman of the management board,
Edzard Reuter, spent much of his time diversifying the corporation.  His suc-
cessor has focused on its corporate businesses so far; indeed, within two months
of Reuter’s retirement from the management board in April 1995, the company
began the restructuring process.28  Partly as a result of these efforts, the market
value of Daimler-Benz stock has increased from $24.7 billion at the beginning
of 1995 to more than fifty billion dollars by the end of June 1998.29
                                                          
24. See Bradley et al., supra note 4, at 70; David Duffy & Luchlan Murray, The Wooing of Ameri-
can Investors, WALL ST.  J., Feb.  25, 1994, at A14.
25. See Wendy Cooper, Discovering the Foreign Investor, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, July 1993, at
81, 81-84.
26. See DAIMLER-BENZ, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (1996).
27. For an excellent discussion of how German and U.S. accounting systems can be reconciled, see
Salomon Smith Barney, Gyrus—The Search for Value in Global Autos, GLOBAL EQUITY RES.
AUTOMOTIVE, May 29, 1998, at 83, 83-109.
28. See Daimler in Difficulty, FIN. TIMES, Aug.  8, 1995, at 13; Wolfgang Muncha & Peter Norman,
Planes, Trains, and Automobiles, FIN.  TIMES, Nov.  7, 1995, at 19.
29. Market values are computed from Daimler-Benz AG, in STANDARD & POOR’S STOCK
REPORTS (Jan.  11, 1995) and Chrysler Corp., in STANDARD & POOR’S STOCK REPORTS (Aug.  15,
1998).
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On October 5, 1993, Daimler-Benz listed its shares on the NYSE to gain ac-
cess to the global capital markets.  The German public securities market is ex-
tremely small relative to its GDP.  At the end of 1995, the market capitalization
of German exchange-traded stock was only $547 billion, or less than forty per-
cent of its GDP.30  In contrast, the market capitalization of the U.S. market was
approximately $6.9 trillion, or nearly sixty percent of its GDP.31  Thus, Daimler-
Benz gained entry into a much more resilient market that would provide the
company greater financial flexibility than would the German market.  Financial
flexibility may be necessary to compete effectively in the product markets.
It is unclear whether Daimler-Benz decided to make this move on its own,
with perhaps some prodding from its principal shareholder, Deutsche Bank, or
whether Deutsche Bank insisted on the NYSE listing and perhaps improved
performance by Daimler-Benz to help solve some of the bank’s own financial
performance problems.  Two facts are germane.  First, Deutsche Bank had
been experiencing return on equity of approximately eight percent, while Citi-
bank and other global bankers were enjoying returns on equity of roughly
twenty percent.32  Deutsche Bank was far from being a high-performance bank.
Perhaps it urged Daimler-Benz to improve both Daimler-Benz’s and the bank’s
performances, thereby enhancing its own ability to attract global capital.  Sec-
ond, new Daimler-Benz shares were not sold at the time of the listing.  Rather,
existing shares were bought by the ADR custodian and were converted into
ADRs.  However, in January 1994, Deutsche Bank sold approximately $700
million of Daimler-Benz shares in an underwritten secondary offering in the
United States.33  Thus, the first beneficiary of Daimler-Benz’s newly discovered
access to global capital was Deutsche Bank itself.  Daimler-Benz raised nearly
$200 million through a rights offering in June 1994.34  Since then, Daimler-Benz
has raised many hundreds of millions more in the United States.
Deutsche Bank’s own well-being has been beneficially influenced not only
by Daimler-Benz’s access to global capital, but also by its increased commit-
ment to shareholder value creation.  It is one thing to raise capital in global
markets; it is quite another to raise it on favorable terms.  To do so, Daimler-
Benz had to make a credible commitment to the global investment community
that it would reform itself by adopting the contractarian model of governance,
the system more closely associated with shareholder value creation.
Since its listing on the NYSE, Daimler-Benz has taken many positive steps
toward altering its regard for shareholder value.  In fact, in its 1997 Annual Re-
port, Daimler-Benz openly asserted its commitment to generate returns in
every business unit demanded by international standards, to achieve a leading
position in every market it serves, to seek opportunities to expand its presence
                                                          
30. See RICHARD LEVICH, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 528 (1998).
31. See id.
32. See Templeman et al., supra note 19, at 56.
33. See Daimler-Benz AG, in STANDARD & POOR’S STOCK REPORTS (Mar.  18, 1994).
34. See Daimler-Benz AG, in STANDARD & POOR’S STOCK REPORTS (Jan.  11, 1995).
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in foreign markets with a special emphasis on Asia, and to grow businesses in
which it has technological and managerial expertise.35  These corporate goals
are ones that the most extreme shareholder value creation organization would
be proud to advertise.  The list, quite symbolically, makes no mention of happy
employees or a satisfied state.
More concretely, Daimler-Benz has taken a number of steps, including a
voluntary restructuring, both to enhance shareholder wealth and demonstrate
the sincerity of the firm’s new-found commitment to shareholders.
B. Financial Performance
Table 1 provides a financial overview of Daimler-Benz’s performance from
1986 to 1997.  There are several notable features.  First, return on equity
slipped dramatically in the early 1990s.  Admittedly, the very large positive and
negative numbers are, in part, a consequence of extraordinary accounting
items.  However, the pattern is similar with and without the extraordinary
items.  Second, net worth relative to total assets shows heavy use of financial
leverage, though this is not high by auto company standards.  Given that
Daimler-Benz’s market value has averaged a little more than two times its
book value—somewhat higher than most other auto companies—its leverage is
considerably less than it appears to be.  Moreover, as the data in Panels A and
B of Table A1 suggest, Daimler-Benz’s financial leverage—even on a book
value basis—is generally lower than that of its automotive peers.  Third, as Ta-
ble 1 reveals, Daimler-Benz’s employment has shrunk significantly in recent
years.  From a high of nearly 380,000 employees in 1991, Daimler-Benz de-
creased to only 300,000 employees by the end of 1997.  Moreover, most of this
reduction occurred in Germany, where the number of employees dropped by
more than 80,000 over the same period.  Finally, Daimler-Benz’s market capi-
talization reached $26.9 billion by the end of 1986.  Despite the net sale of addi-
tional shares, market capitalization did not exceed this value again until 1996.
Overall, the evidence suggests that financial performance began to improve af-
ter two important events in the early 1990s—the listing of Daimler-Benz shares
on the NYSE and the replacement of the “communitarian” incumbent Chief
Executive Officer (“CEO”) with a new “contractarian” CEO.
C. Change in Ownership
In addition to the listing of shares on the NYSE, a second, highly significant
action also occurred in late 1993: Deutsche Bank agreed to reduce its owner-
ship of Daimler-Benz from roughly thirty percent to less than twenty-five per-
cent.36  Even though the magnitude of the change was not large, it did signal to
the market that large banks might have less influence on the company.
                                                          
35. See DAIMLER-BENZ, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1998).
36. See Waller, supra note 13, at 25.
TABLE 1
DAIMLER-BENZ FINANCIAL PROFILE
Period Ending 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Sales (DM millions) 65.5 67.5 73.5 76.4 85.5 95.0 98.5 97.7 104.1 103.5 107.7 124.0
Net Income (DM millions) 1.8 1.8 1.7 6.8 1.8 1.9 1.5 0.6 0.9 -5.7 2.8 8.0
Return on Ending Equity (%) 15.9 18.4 15.7 41.4 10.4 10.3 7.6 2.2 4.4 -41.4 10.5 22.9
Return on Beginning Equity (%) N/A 16.0 17.6 62.9 10.9 11.2 7.7 3.7 5.0 -29.1 12.1 30.4
Net Worth: Total Assets (%) 26.4 20.8 20.8 26.2 25.6 24.9 22.2 19.5 21.0 15.1 23.5 25.6
Cash Flow: Total Revenues (%) 9.5 9.8 8.3 7.8 7.8 8.2 5.4 10.1 10.8 4.3 7.6 10.5
Revenues per Employee (DM) 207.6 207.1 218.1 224.8 228.5 249.0 257.6 263.4 304.4 322.4 366.6 413.2
Total Employees (thousands) 320.0 326.3 338.7 368.2 376.8 379.3 376.5 366.7 330.6 311.0 290.0 300.1
Employees in Germany (thousands) 257.5 262.7 262.3 298.2 303.4 305.3 302.5 284.6 251.2 242.1 228.8 225.3
Market Capitalization ($ billions) 26.9 15.7 17.7 22.3 17.1 22.8 15.5 22.6 25.3 26.1 35.4 35.2
Source:  DAIMLER-BENZ, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT  76, 77 (1996);   Daimler-Benz, SEC Form 20-F, at F2, F3, F15 (Apr. 8, 1998); MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES (multiple issues).  There are slight discrepancies between data reported in the annual reports and data reported in secondary sources; we use secondary-source
data when comparing Daimler-Benz to other companies.
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As noted, under the German system of corporate governance, banks play a
vital role.  This influence causes companies to over-invest, to borrow more than
they need, and to diversify excessively.  Further, bank influence hampers re-
structuring efforts that increase financial risk, such as borrowing funds or sell-
ing assets solely to pay dividends, or transactions that reduce the co-insurance
effects of corporate diversification, such as launching spin-offs.  Efficient cor-
porate restructuring transactions are simply much less likely to occur in firms
that are subject to communitarian corporate governance structures.
In January 1994, when Deutsche Bank announced that it would sell a large
stake in Daimler-Benz, Daimler-Benz stock rose approximately thirteen per-
cent higher than the market return for the month, no doubt in large measure
due to this signal of reduced bank influence.37  With reduced bank ownership
and the prospect of even less bank ownership in the future, the intrinsic value
of listing on the NYSE is greatly enhanced.  The liquidity of the NYSE and the
transparency of U.S. accounting standards are valuable to investors.  As
Daimler-Benz becomes more oriented toward increasing shareholder value, the
liquidity of the NYSE might be used to achieve such restructurings as mergers,
spin-offs, or equity carve-outs.  Finally, increased share liquidity and dispersed
ownership also increases the firm’s exposure to the disciplinary effects of the
market for corporate control.  That is, the easier it is for a potential raider to
buy shares in a target company, the greater the discipline of the financial mar-
kets in keeping managers from dissipating corporate resources.  Although this
is unlikely to be a significant source of value in the Daimler-Benz case, there is
still an improvement in the value of a share.
D. Restructuring
A third significant action occurred in mid-July 1995.  The new chairman of
the management board, Jurgen Schrempp, announced plans to embark on a
major restructuring of the Daimler-Benz Aerospace Division.38  This an-
nouncement was followed by more specific announcements and actions, in-
cluding walking away from Fokker Aircraft—of which Daimler-Benz owned
fifty-one percent—in early 1996.  This initial announcement was followed by
many other announcements of asset sales or business closures in aerospace and
in the electronics/diesel/railway system business, which was known as AEG
Daimler-Benz Industries until 1996.39  At the time of the initial announcement,
July 21, 1996, Daimler-Benz stock experienced an excess return of approxi-
mately two percent.40
The need for the restructuring grew over the period from 1986 to 1993,
when Daimler-Benz increased its diversification significantly.  Since then, it has
                                                          
37. See BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL MARKETS, HISTORICAL RETURNS DATABASE (May 1998).
38. See Brian Coleman, Daimler Aerospace Comes Down to Earth, WALL ST.  J., July 21, 1995, at
A6.
39. See Daimler-Benz, supra note 14, at 3.
40. See BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra note 37.
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refocused and become more concentrated in its core business.  Table 2 shows
the revenue percentages generated by the different lines of business between
1986 and 1997.  It also shows the percentage of revenue generated outside of
Germany.  Clearly, the company became more diversified internationally by
1997 than it had been before.  This trend is beneficial because it limits the risk
of real exchange rate changes.  Consistent with the discussion in the Bradley et
al. article, greater globalization of a firm’s business is likely to lead to a greater
reliance on contractarian forms of corporate governance.  In the area of cross-
industry diversification, it is evident that Daimler-Benz is concentrating its re-
sources in areas where it arguably retains substantial comparative advantage.
The percentage of revenues derived from automobiles has increased, as has the
percentage of revenues from its service subsidiary.  On the other hand, Daim-
ler-Benz’s interests in electrical and aerospace business have been reduced sub-
stantially.
In its 1996 Annual Report, the company specifically noted how it had over-
hauled its business portfolio:
What was once a broad assortment of 35 separate areas of commercial activity has
now been trimmed and combined into 23 business units.  This was mainly the result of
eliminating businesses which could not meet requisite earnings and return targets or
did not fit within the core activities.  Highlights of this effort included:
(1)  Withdrawal from Fokker’s and Dornier’s regional aircraft businesses;
(2)  Disposition of the energy systems technology business;
(3)  Disposition of the industrial automation business;
(4)  Withdrawal from debis’ marketing services activities; and
(5)  Sale of the Group’s recognition and sorting systems business.
41
However, despite its wide and, perhaps with hindsight, ill-conceived diversi-
fication strategy, Daimler-Benz never suffered a serious conglomerate dis-
count.  Berger and Ofek show that conglomerate firms sell, on average, at sub-
stantial discounts to the aggregate stand-alone value of their components.42
Tables 3A and 3B show valuation metrics for Daimler-Benz compared to cer-
tain industrial averages.  Specifically, the tables show its historical market
price-to-book-value ratio and its historical market-price-to-cash-flow measures.
Along with these measures are identical average metrics for the firms in the in-
dustries in which Daimler-Benz operates.  If there had been a significant, obvi-
ous discount, it would appear as a linear combination of industry metrics
weighted by Daimler-Benz Industry Weightings being greater than Daimler-
Benz’s own market-price-to-book-value and market-price-to-cash-flow meas-
ures.  That is, the weighted average valuation metrics, such as market-to-book
                                                          
41. DAIMLER-BENZ, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1997) (format of numbered list differs from bul-
leted list in original; changes reflect journal conventions).
42. See Paul Berger & Eli Ofek, Diversification’s Effect on Firm Value, 37 J. FIN. ECON. 39, 39
(1995); see also Robert Comment & Gregg Jarrell, Corporate Focus and Stock Returns, 37 J. FIN.
ECON. 67, 67 (1995).
TABLE 2
DAIMLER-BENZ DIVERSIFICATION
(PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL REVENUES FROM DAIMLER-BENZ DIVISIONS)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996* 1997*
Mercedes Benz 75.0 75.4 74.7 71.9 67.7 68.7 65.8 63.1 65.6 66.4 69.4 70.5
AEG Daimler-Benz
Industries/ Directly
Managed Businesses
16.9 11.8 17.9 15.5 14.9 14.3 11.3 11.0 9.6 9.5 7.2 5.8
Daimler-Benz
Aerospace
7.4 6.5 6.8 9.8 14.2 12.6 17.0 18.6 16.4 14.4 11.7 11.7
Debis/Services N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.2 4.4 5.9 7.3 8.4 9.6 11.7 11.8
Foreign Revenue 57.5 58.4 60.4 61.3 57.1 53.2 56.8 60.8 62.5 63.2 63.0 66.9
*A reorganization occurred in 1996, and historical results were not restated. The new categories include automotive, aerospace, services, and directly
managed businesses.  The services category is roughly equivalent to debis, and the directly-managed-businesses category is roughly equivalent to AEG
Daimler-Benz Industries after some asset sales.
Source:  DAIMLER-BENZ, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 76, 77 (1996); Daimler-Benz, SEC Form 20-F, at F39 (Apr. 8, 1998).
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and price-to-cash-flow, would exceed those same metrics for the conglomerate,
Daimler-Benz.  For the years before 1993, Daimler-Benz’s valuation metrics
roughly approximated those of its reference group.  For later years, Daimler-
Benz had higher valuation parameters than any of its component industries.
The data suggest that the relative market valuation of the company’s core busi-
nesses improved as a result of the refocusing of its business mix.  We attribute
this result to the increased attention to shareholder value and the movement
toward the contractarian corporate governance system.
TABLE 3A
CONGLOMERATE VALUATION PARAMETERS:
MARKET PRICE TO BOOK VALUE
Index or Company Name 1/93 1/94 1/95 1/96 1/97 11/97 Average
Automobile 0.93 1.62 1.73 1.68 2.09 2.06 1.8
Electrical & Electronics 1.97 2.28 2.19 2.62 2.72 3.24 2.1
Financial Services 1.48 1.86 1.66 2.18 2.34 2.85 2.1
Aerospace & Military
Technology
1.22 1.80 1.86 2.74 3.64 3.69 2.7
Boeing 1.69 1.82 1.78 2.75 3.40 3.80 2.6
Daimler-Benz 1.42 2.20 1.93 1.90 4.20 2.44 2.7
Source:  MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (data taken from monthly is-
sues, as indicated).  These are industry averages except for the two named companies.
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TABLE 3B
CONGLOMERATE VALUATION PARAMETERS:
MARKET PRICE TO CASH FLOW
Index or Company Name 1/93 1/94 1/95 1/96 1/97 11/97 Average
Automobile 4.8 6.5 6.5 5.6 6.9 6.6 6.3
Electrical & Electronics 7.2 9.3 8.2 9.7 12.3 11.5 9.9
Financial Services* 24.5 21.2 16.3 23.3 19.0 24.7 21.1
Aerospace & Military
Technology
5.5 7.4 9.3 12.4 15.0 11.7 10.7
Boeing 5.5 6.5 7.9 13.9 20.7 N/A 11.78
Daimler-Benz 3.2 4.6 5.5 6.2 31.8 8.7 14.1
Daimler-Benz* 9.7 28.5 Loss 33.6 Loss
*Price to Earnings
Source:  MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (data taken from monthly is-
sues, as indicated).  These are industry averages except for the two named companies.
TABLE 4A
COMPARATIVE VALUATION PARAMETERS:
MARKET  PRICE TO BOOK VALUE
D.-B. BMW Porsche VW Chrysler Ford GM Honda Nissan Toyota Volvo
1986 5.26 3.52 3.35 1.42 1.33 1.29 0.72 1.63 0.69 2.22 1.57
1987 2.52 2.55 1.27 0.73 0.90 1.36 0.64 1.58 1.18 1.61 1.01
1988 3.52 2.54 1.73 1.13 0.88 1.39 0.79 2.24 1.91 2.17 1.27
1989 3.10 2.57 2.08 1.54 0.58 0.99 0.73 1.82 2.21 2.05 1.28
1990 2.11 1.19 1.67 0.88 0.39 0.55 0.60 1.17 0.99 1.39 0.48
1991 2.11 1.51 1.14 0.80 0.39 0.57 0.55 1.35 0.89 1.22 0.72
1992 1.42 1.43 0.90 0.58 1.53 0.91 0.74 1.15 0.78 1.17 0.81
1993 2.20 2.01 1.76 1.08 2.09 2.14 6.48 1.43 1.05 1.39 1.44
1994 1.93 2.13 2.83 1.27 2.54 1.79 5.02 1.78 1.31 1.62 2.04
1995 1.90 1.94 3.21 1.48 1.83 1.36 3.01 2.04 1.39 1.63 1.44
1996 4.20 2.71 5.28 2.13 2.28 1.52 2.24 2.82 1.24 2.35 1.55
1997 2.44 3.01 10.63 3.27 2.08 1.91 2.10 3.24 1.03 2.46 1.71
Average 2.73 2.26 2.99 1.36 1.40 1.32 1.97 1.86 1.22 1.77 1.28
Source:  MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (multiple issues);  STANDARD & POOR’S STOCK REPORTS (multiple reports).
Results are based on data available as of January 1 of the following year.  The 1997 results for BMW, Porsche, VW, Nissan, Toyota, and Volvo are based
on data available on December 1, 1997.
TABLE 4B
COMPARATIVE VALUATION PARAMETERS:
MARKET PRICE TO CASH FLOW
D.-B. BMW Porsche VW Chrysler Ford GM Honda Nissan Toyota Volvo
1986 9.3 7.4 5.6 2.0 3.6 2.2 2.3 5.9 N/A 10.9 4.6
1987 5.0 5.1 2.4 1.3 3.2 2.6 2.2 6.5 N/A 9.5 3.5
1988 6.3 5.0 3.8 2.7 4.0 3.0 2.8 11.0 N/A 12.5 4.5
1989 6.1 5.2 6.1 4.3 2.4 2.4 2.8 7.6 12.0 12.6 5.0
1990 2.7 2.9 4.4 2.5 6.9 2.1 2.8 4.8 5.4 7.5 2.3
1991 5.1 3.4 3.2 2.2 Loss 5.7 Loss 5.5 5.2 6.8 16.3
1992 3.2 3.4 3.4 1.7 6.0 3.6 10.8 5.3 4.7 7.8 6.5
1993 4.6 5.0 10.4 2.9 6.1 4.0 7.6 7.6 5.0 10.0 Loss
1994 5.5 6.1 Loss 5.3 4.1 2.3 3.0 8.8 6.0 14.9 5.4
1995 6.2 4.8 12.1 2.5 6.3 2.1 3.2 12.0 5.9 13.3 3.9
1996 31.8 6.3 13.5 3.4 5.0 2.5 3.1 11.2 4.9 18.8 4.2
1997 8.7 7.2 27.2 6.7 5.8 2.7 3.1 11.9 2.7 16.8 5.9
Average 7.9 5.2 7.7 3.1 4.5 2.9 3.6 8.2 5.8 11.8 5.2
Source:  MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (multiple issues);  STANDARD & POOR’S STOCK REPORTS (multiple reports).
Results are based on data available as of January 1 of the following year.  The 1997 results for BMW, Porsche, VW, Nissan, Toyota, and Volvo are based
on data available on December 1, 1997.  Losses are noted as “loss” and are computed as zero.
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Even though Daimler-Benz went through a period of diversifying from the
automobile business, it continued to be highly valued relative to other automo-
bile companies.  Tables 4A and 4B show Daimler-Benz’s value compared to
other automobile firms.  The non-German automobile companies have stock
traded in the United States; therefore, their measures of book value and cash
flow comply with U.S. GAAP.  Except for Daimler-Benz, none of the German
firms are traded in the United States; therefore, their book values and cash
flows are reported according to German GAAP.  Here,  Daimler-Benz’s data is
reported using German GAAP; however, because its average valuation pa-
rameters exceeded those of its German counterparts, use of German GAAP
does not cause extreme distortion.  Between 1993 and 1997, Daimler-Benz had
a higher market-price-to-book-value ratio and higher market-price-to-cash-
flow value than virtually all other automobile firms.  Its average valuation pa-
rameters also exceeded those of other relevant automobile companies, except
that its average market-price-to-cash-flow value was lower than that of Toyota.
Everything considered, Daimler-Benz’s renewed focus on the automobile
business and its willingness to shed poor performing, non-core businesses was a
plus.  Unfortunately, German governance and a comparatively illiquid German
stock market limit the methods by which Daimler-Benz can dispose of its assets
and use its proceeds compared to methods available in the United States.  Be-
cause a bank dominates its supervisory board, it is unlikely that Daimler-Benz
will ever do a complete spin-off of a division to existing shareholders.  Simi-
larly, a carve-out may be prevented, even though the firm would receive cash.
The funds could be invested in activities that are riskier than the ones carved
out or invested in core businesses, rather than in diversifying activities.  Such
action would place Daimler-Benz’s debt in a riskier position than it currently is
in.  In addition, because of the low liquidity of the German stock markets, it is
not clear whether divestiture of a division through a carve-out would ever yield
higher proceeds than would a direct sale to another company.  Nonetheless, in
view of Daimler-Benz’s limited options for divestiture, the company seems to
be moving forward in refocusing itself.
E. Incentive Compensation
The fourth important action undertaken by Daimler-Benz was its adoption
of a stock-oriented incentive compensation plan.  This plan is quite a departure
from customary practice in Germany.  The company wrote in its 1996 Annual
Report:
Daimler-Benz must also achieve its strategic goals in order to increase stockholder
value.  These objectives can in turn only be fulfilled if the Group’s employees are
properly incentivized through a performance oriented compensation system and par-
ticipation in the group’s success.  Recognizing the need for prompt action, the Board
of Management proposed adoption of a stock option plan at the 1996 annual general
meeting of stockholders.  At this year’s annual general meeting, the Board of Man-
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agement will seek authorization to increase the capital dedicated to the plan.  Partici-
pation in the plan will then be extended to additional levels of management.43
Not only has the company adopted a stock option plan, but it also has im-
plemented a bonus plan that depends on the actual level of dividends exceeding
a specified target.44  This plan may conflict with the stock-option initiative be-
cause it encourages the company to distribute cash, whereas the stock price is
enhanced through retention of earnings.  Nonetheless, these are new incentives
not to hoard cash.  Given the incentives to retain excess funds to fund negative
net present value projects, we interpret this part of the new compensation plan
as an effort to manage the firm’s communitarian investment incentive.
Daimler-Benz management compensation has reflected the company’s suc-
cess.  In 1995, when Daimler-Benz lost money, total remuneration to the man-
aging and supervisory boards was DM 12.5 million.  In 1996, when the company
returned to profitability, total cash remuneration to its boards, which remained
the same size as before, was DM 25.5 million.  Remunerations—salary plus bo-
nus—more than doubled in response to improved corporate performance.45
The supervisory board is now remunerated based on the difference between
actual dividends paid and a specified threshold level.46  For 1997, ninety-three
percent of the remuneration paid to supervisory board members as a group was
paid as a result of this arrangement.47  The incentive compensation scheme for
the supervisory board accomplishes two objectives.  First, it provides incentives
for the board that are aligned with those of the shareholders’ interests.  Second,
it reduces, and perhaps even eliminates, the firm’s incentive to hoard cash or to
over-invest.  It motivates directors to give free cash flow to shareholders rather
than invest in negative net present value opportunities.
F. Security Price Performance
Table 5 shows the performance of Daimler-Benz stock over various time
periods.  Before Daimler-Benz listed on the NYSE and began its restructuring
activities, Daimler-Benz stock languished.  For example, its compound annual
total return in U.S. dollars from January 1, 1984, to February 29, 1996, was only
eleven percent.48  This return contrasts with the total annual return of Standard
and Poor’s 500 (“S&P 500”) of 17.1%.49  From January 1990 to the end of 1997,
its return was seven percent compared to 13.5% for the S&P 500.  Eliminating
those early years, its performance roughly matches its global industry bench-
mark.  Consequently, the performance of Daimler-Benz improved relative to
                                                          
43. DAIMLER-BENZ, supra note 41, at 4.
44. See Daimler-Benz, supra note 14, at 67.
45. See id.
46. See Daimler-Benz, supra note 16, at 64.
47. See id.
48. See DAIMLER-BENZ, supra note 35, at 88.
49. See BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra note 37.
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that of its industry peers and relative to that of the overall U.S. stock market as
the firm transformed itself into a contractarian form of corporate governance.
TABLE 5
DAIMLER-BENZ: PERCENTAGE TOTAL ANNUAL RETURNS
FOR SELECTED PERIODS
Daimler-Benz
Returns
S&P 500
Index
S&P
Auto Index
1/1/90-12/31/97 7.0 13.5 7.15
11/1/93-6/30/98 22.6 23.6 21.70
1/1/95-6/30/98 27.0 32.1 33.40
6/1/93-6/30/98 37.0 30.8 39.80
Source:  BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL MARKETS, HISTORICAL RETURNS DATABASE (May 1998).
G. The Chrysler Merger
On May 7, 1998, Daimler-Benz announced it would merge with Chrysler in
a stock transaction.50  The two companies are now known as DaimlerChrysler
AG and have combined revenues of $130 billion.51  Although investment bank-
ers characterized the transaction as a merger of equals, Daimler-Benz  effec-
tively bought Chrysler for $38 billion.52  Between the close of the NYSE on
May 6, 1998, and the close on May 8, 1998, Chrysler stock rose by 10.24%, and
Daimler-Benz stock rose by 2.59%.53  The S&P 500 rose by only .29% over the
same period.54  The market obviously greeted this merger with great enthusi-
asm.55
                                                          
50. See Daimler, Chrysler Revise Swap Ratio in Auto Merger, BLOOMBERG FIN. MARKETS
COMMODITIES NEWS, June 8, 1998, at 1.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See Comparative Returns May 6, 1998 to June 11, 1998, BLOOMBERG FIN. MARKETS
COMMODITIES NEWS (Chrysler Corp., S&P 500, S&P Automobiles).  Over the same period, the S&P
Auto Index increased by 2.89%.  This increase was slightly greater than the rise in Daimler-Benz
stock.  However, the S&P Auto Index includes Chrysler, which had more than a 10% gain.  Without
Chrysler, Daimler-Benz would have risen more than the auto index.  Both boards approved the merger
before the end of May, shareholder votes for both companies were conducted in Sept. 1998, and the
deal was approved, as expected.  See id.
54. See id.
55. For example, Salomon Smith Barney was absolutely thrilled by the combination.  See Salomon
Smith Barney, supra note 27, at 83, 331.
LOGUE WITH TABLES_FMT2 02/28/00  4:28 PM
106 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 62:  No. 3
The exchange ratio was .6235 DaimlerChrysler share for each share of
Chrysler held.56  Daimler-Benz holders received one share of DaimlerChrysler
for each share held.  After the deal closed, there were a little more than one
billion shares outstanding.  At the time of closing, Daimler-Benz’s former
shareholders owned roughly fifty-six percent of the combined company, and
Chrysler’s original shareholders owned roughly forty-four percent.57
Daimler-Benz estimated that sixty-three percent of its stock was held by
German owners, and ten percent of its shareholders were in the United States.58
There is no comparable public data for Chrysler, but, if Chrysler’s German
ownership is comparable to Daimler-Benz’s U.S. ownership, German owner-
ship of the combined firm has been reduced to less than forty percent of the to-
tal.  This, by itself, may be sufficient to keep the new firm from slipping back to
Daimler-Benz’s old communitarian ways.  The preponderance of voting rights
will not belong to German banks as it did, because all shares will carry the same
voting rights.  The merger may solidify DaimlerChrysler’s commitment to focus
on shareholder value creation.  Indeed, one might even speculate that with a
change of ownership of the combined entity, the company may eventually
eliminate its dual headquarters—Stuttgart and Detroit—by leaving Stuttgart
and re-incorporating in the United States or some other country, such as the
United Kingdom, where the contractarian model of corporate governance pre-
vails.
In a recent Fortune article that described the motivation for and the struc-
ture of the merger, Jurgen Schrempp, the CEO of Daimler-Benz, summarized
his view of the company as follows:
We are fortunate in another area, too.  We are registered on the New York Stock Ex-
change.  We have started doing U.S. GAAP . . . accounting, despite hefty criticism in
Germany.  And in the past two years, we have changed the criteria around the com-
pany to put it on a [more profit-oriented] American basis.  You know that I am called
Mr. Shareholder Value and not always in a very positive vein.  I think we have
changed Daimler-Benz—not in a totally Anglo-Saxon sense, because I think there are
some great benefits in Germany, but I think we have moved in that direction.59
The CEO’s comments are indicative of Daimler-Benz’s favorable attitude to-
ward a contractarian corporate governance system.  The post-combination
ownership structure of DaimlerChrysler AG moves the company further away
from the communitarian corporate governance system.
Some further evidence on the strategic and financial consequences of re-
taining the communitarian corporate governance system is provided in another
                                                          
56. See Daimler, Chrysler Revise Swap Ratio in Auto Merger, supra note 50, at 1.
57. See Chrysler Corp., supra note 29; Daimler-Benz in STANDARD & POOR’S STOCK REPORTS
(July 2, 1996).  At the time of the merger, Daimler-Benz had 513.7 million shares outstanding, and
Chrysler had 645.5 million shares outstanding.  After the merger, the total number of shares will be
513.7 million shares plus 0.6235 times 645.5 million shares, for a total of 916 million shares.  Chrysler
owners will own 402.3 shares of 916 million shares, or 44% of the total.  
58. Data was taken from Daimler-Benz’s website, which was posted before the merger in 1998.
See Daimler-Benz (visited Sept. 15, 1998) <http://www.daimler-benz.com>.
59. Alex Taylor III, Gentlemen, Start Your Engines, FORTUNE, June 8, 1998, at 138, 146.
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Fortune article entitled “Volkswagen’s Big New Headache.”60  The article de-
scribes the impact of the Daimler-Benz and Chrysler merger on Volkswagen
(“VW”) as follows:
The biggest challenge VW may face is winning those who will fuel any global expan-
sion—international investors.  VW is an inward-looking company, 20% owned by the
German state of Lower Saxony, whose minister sits on the board and whose first con-
cern is protecting jobs.  By contrast, Daimler was able to merge smoothly with Chrys-
ler because it had become Germany’s poster boy for shareholder value.  Daimler was
the first German company to list shares on the New York Stock Exchange and adopt
U.S. accounting standards.  Comparing VW with Daimler when it comes to wooing
investors “is like chalk and cheese” says John Lawson at Salomon Smith Barney in
London.  “You are talking about a shareholder backwater on one hand, and on the
other a company that is trying its best to drag its part of Germany into a more Anglo-
Saxon culture.”61
Even before the merger was finalized, DaimlerChrysler announced plans
for three billion dollars in cost savings to enhance share value.62  These savings
will be accomplished by a contraction in employment at the newly combined
firm.  This plan is clear evidence of a shift in the mode of corporate governance
from communitarian to contractarian.
The shares of DaimlerChrysler are now listed on the NYSE.  They are not
traded as ADRs; rather, real shares are traded.  Moreover, the shares are regis-
tered, unlike the shares of most German companies, which are in bearer form.63
The company pays dividends, holds shareholder meetings, and conducts voting
largely in accordance with German practices; these practices required some
forbearance by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and some
changes by DaimlerChrysler.64  However, some adjustments have been made.
For example, under German law, only shareholders who own shares on the
date of the shareholder meetings can vote.65  However, DaimlerChrysler has
agreed to conform to SEC rules that require ten days’ notice of a record date
and thirty days between the record and meeting dates.66  Similarly, Daimler-
Chrysler shareholders will vote in person at shareholder meetings without
having to give three days’ notice of intent to vote at the meeting.67
Changes such as these may not have a huge effect on the governance of
DaimlerChrysler in the near future, but there certainly could be a long-term ef-
fect as DaimlerChrysler falls under the more intense scrutiny of U.S. institu-
                                                          
60. Janet Guyon, Volkswagen’s Big New Headache, FORTUNE, June 8, 1998, at 144, 144.
61. Id.
62. See Gregory L. White & Brian Coleman, Chrysler Daimler Focus on Value of Stock, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 21, 1998, at A3.
63. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Release No. 34-40597 (Int’l Series Release No.
1163), ¶ 2 (Oct. 23, 1998) (File No. SR-NYSE-98-37).
64. See id.
65. See id. ¶ 3.
66. See id. ¶ 4.
67. See id. at ¶ 5.
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tional investors.68  The board’s composition will surely be affected.  Moreover,
as American influence increases as a result of bringing so many senior Chrysler
managers into the combined entity, and as the center of gravity of decision-
making shifts in favor of the United States, the company may switch its corpo-
rate nationality from Germany to the United States.
We interpret the transaction itself, as well as the strategic impact of the
transaction on competitors, as evidence that supports the movement toward the
contractarian corporate governance system.  It is not possible to know how suc-
cessful the merged company will be, but it seems clear that investors and ana-
lysts view the deal favorably, that the principals involved attribute the ability to
complete a stock-based transaction to Daimler-Benz’s willingness to list its
shares on the NYSE several years ago, and that other German firms in the
same industry which continue to embrace the communitarian corporate gov-
ernance system are now viewed as being at a distinct competitive disadvantage.
Changes in the financial and product markets have indeed created a need for
communitarian companies to become more contractarian; strategic advantage
is attained by the company that first recognizes and understands that need.
IV
CONCLUSION
To compete in fiercely competitive global product markets, companies must
have access to global capital markets.  They need financial flexibility to move
quickly and decisively when confronted with competitive challenges.
Daimler-Benz had been operating in a very protected environment.  The
German bank-dominated governance system in Germany did not require
Daimler-Benz to maximize shareholder wealth.  Rather, the supervisory board
seemed content with achieving satisfactory financial performance and trying to
meet the economic, political, and social goals of other stakeholders—
debtholders, employees, customers, and the state.  However, the automobile
business is one of the most intensely competitive businesses in the world.  To
compete effectively, companies such as Daimler-Benz need a tremendous
amount of financial flexibility.  To achieve this end, Daimler-Benz had to look
outside of Germany for the means.  To convince foreign investors that it was
not simply raising capital so that it might continue to conform to German cor-
porate governance standards, Daimler-Benz had to perform as does a company
conscious of shareholder value.  It restructured itself dramatically and took ac-
tions that were uncharacteristic of German firms, signaling to investors that
Daimler-Benz was changing.  Daimler-Benz made obvious and credible com-
mitments to reorient itself in favor of shareholder value.  The acquisition of
                                                          
68. DaimlerChrysler may not be influenced by index fund managers.  Surprisingly, although
Chrysler was included in the Standard & Poor’s Stock Index, the new DaimlerChrysler will not be in-
cluded because it is classified as a foreign company.
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Chrysler was the most recent step, with the new ownership structure and its po-
tential for altering the composition of DaimlerChrysler’s supervisory board.
Several other German companies have followed Daimler-Benz into a
NYSE listing, two of which—Deutsche Telecom and Hoechst—are also multi-
national giants.  As more German firms follow, this trend will hasten the de-
mise of the communitarian form of corporate governance, at least in Germany.
LOGUE WITH TABLES_FMT2 02/28/00  4:28 PM
110 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 62:  No. 3
APPENDIX
TABLE A1: PANEL A
COMPARATIVE FINANCIAL DATA
LONG TERM DEBT/NET WORTH IN PERCENTAGES
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
D.-B. 25 25 28 46 32 57 19.3
Chrysler 245 178 1005 71 90 62 78.9
Ford 221 335 353 301 287 265 261.2
GM 157 685 605 292 157 170 237.1
Honda 55 55 63 58 57 49 52.6
Nissan 101 117 150 155 142 141 N/A
Toyota 32 33 36 35 37 36 N/A
Volvo 30 53 49 23 24 27 31.4
Source: Auto & Truck Industry, VALUE LINE INVESTMENT SURVEY 101-11 (Mar. 14, 1997);
Chrysler Corp., in STANDARD & POOR’S STOCK REPORTS (Feb. 24, 1997 & Feb. 25, 1998); Daim-
ler-Benz AG, in STANDARD & POOR’S STOCK REPORTS (Feb. 11, 1997); Ford Motors, in
STANDARD & POOR’S STOCK REPORTS (Feb. 3, 1997 & Jan. 30, 1998); General Motors, in
STANDARD & POOR’S STOCK REPORTS (Jan. 30, 1997); Honda Motor, in STANDARD & POOR’S
STOCK REPORTS (Mar. 28, 1997 & Mar. 20, 1998); Nissan, in VALUE LINE INVESTMENT SURVEY
108 (Sept. 11, 1998); Toyota, in VALUE LINE INVESTMENT SURVEY, 110 (Sept. 11, 1998); Volvo
AB, in STANDARD & POOR’S STOCK REPORTS (Apr. 1, 1997).  See also Table 1 note.
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TABLE A1: PANEL B
COMPARATIVE FINANCIAL DATA
NET WORTH/TOTAL ASSETS IN PERCENTAGES
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
D.-B. 25.7 22.9 19.9 21.6 14.9 23.4 38.0
Chrysler 14.2 16.4 13.6 19.8 20.3 20.6 18.9
Ford 11.7 6.3 6.1 8.3 9.7 9.9 11.0
GM 14.2 0.7 0.6 4.6 1.4 10.3 7.6
Honda 36.8 34.9 34.7 33.1 33.7 32.5 33.0
Nissan N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Toyota N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Volvo 31.7 25.4 20.1 31.3 36.9 36.9 41.0
Source: Chrysler Corp., in STANDARD & POOR’S STOCK REPORTS (Feb. 24, 1997 & Feb. 25, 1997);
Daimler-Benz AG, in STANDARD & POOR’S STOCK REPORTS (Feb. 11, 1997); Ford Motors, in
STANDARD & POOR’S STOCK REPORTS (Feb. 3, 1997 & Jan. 30, 1998); General Motors, in
STANDARD & POOR’S STOCK REPORTS (Jan. 30, 1997); Honda Motor, in STANDARD & POOR’S
STOCK REPORTS (Mar. 28, 1997 & Mar. 20, 1998); Nissan, in VALUE LINE INVESTMENT SURVEY
108 (Sept. 11, 1998); Toyota, in VALUE LINE INVESTMENT SURVEY, 110 (Sept. 11, 1998); Volvo
AB, in STANDARD & POOR’S STOCK REPORTS (Apr. 1, 1997).  See also Table 1 note.
TABLE  A1: PANEL C
COMPARATIVE FINANCIAL DATA
RETURN ON COMMON EQUITY IN PERCENTAGES
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
D.-B. 9.1 3.6 N/A 3.0 N/A 10.5 26.6
Chrysler N/A 6.3 35.3 34.7 19.4 32.1 24.5
Ford N/A N/A 16.2 24.5 16.9 15.5 23.9
GM N/A N/A 44.1 44.1 29.7 18.5 32.4
Honda 5.9 3.7 2.5 4.8 6.2 15.0 16.2
Nissan 3.2 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.5 4.0
Toyota 9.4 5.0 3.7 2.6 4.8 7.0 7.5
Volvo 5.2 N/A N/A 19.4 16.4 14.5 22.9
Source:  Auto & Truck Industry, VALUE LINE INVESTMENT SURVEY 101-11 (Mar. 14, 1997).  See
also Table 1 note.  The discrepancies between Value Line data and Daimler-Benz’s 1997 Annual
Report are a consequence of averaging and, for 1993, are explicable only if Value Line used in-
come from operations instead of total net income.
